Their message is categorical: anything short of unconstrained funding, which donors are free to pledge and NGOs free to use for any purpose, violates freedom of association. Constraints thus amount to autocracy, repression and the “shrinking space” for civic activity. Any proposed regulation is decried as inappropriate and abusive and rejected out of hand. These critics never explain what reasonable, proportionate regulation would look like.
The “freedom of association equals free flows of money” dogma is shored up by arguments that further shut down debate. For example, by warning of impending doom: only NGOs, and only if they have foreign funding, can be a check on power and halt Georgia’s descent into authoritarianism, since a succession of ruling parties can’t shake their autocratic instincts, and democratic institutions remain weak. This is despite Western donors having spent billions, over decades, on promoting democracy.
Put plainly, foreign donors must keep up their capture of Georgia’s civil society and media sectors – for the sake of Georgian democracy. This is inconsistent and self-defeating, intellectually and as a practical strategy. It is also patronising, biased and unsustainable.
The right to monitor foreign influence
Days after Georgia killed its foreign agent bills under massive EU pressure, it was reported that the EU had been preparing its own foreign agent law, which will, among others, target NGOs. The UK and Canada are working on similar bills.
Don’t mistake this for gotcha whataboutism or a cheap shot at Western hypocrisy. On the contrary, these moves are a useful, poignant reminder that any country has eminent, honourable reasons to monitor and regulate foreign money and influence, for the sake of accountability, citizens’ agency and equality, national interests and national security, democracy and sovereignty. These Western foreign agent laws might pry open space for that broad, honest discussion and for exploring what appropriate, reasonable regulation should look like.
This will not happen by itself. To date, the discourse about foreign agent laws has been unsatisfying, with gaping holes in its logic and double standards. We must be intentional about asking uncomfortable, but fundamental questions:
How can we reconcile citizens’ ownership of their democracy, their agency and equality, with freedom of association, if the latter is equated with unaccountable flows of money? How can we have an honest conversation between aid recipients and donor countries? How could it broach the discrepancies of power between them and the resulting dependencies and abuses?
How can we distinguish malign interference from beneficial or at least benign assistance? How do we account for the wide grey areas between them?
If the EU, the US, UK and Canada step up regulation of foreign money and influence, must we infer that only “perfect” democracies are entitled to enjoy and protect their sovereignty? Does it mean imperfect democracies and autocracies cannot, by definition, have legitimate concerns about foreign influence, or that by veering from the righteous course of democracy, they relinquish their right to sovereignty? Isn’t it conceivable that a less than perfectly democratic government has an opportunistic desire to silence critics and simultaneously a bona fide interest in preventing injurious interference in domestic affairs?
If some countries are entitled to regulating foreign money and others aren’t, what would be the dividing line? “Democracy versus autocracy”, or powerful, wealthy hegemons versus poor, aid-dependent client states?
How do we translate our ideas into mutually acceptable norms and practices? Should they take the shape of ethics guidelines and self-regulation, or binding norms? Are quantitative benchmarks (e.g. at what percent of foreign funding certain regulations kick in) the way to go?
Finally, how do we work towards sustainable, autonomous civil societies and media? How do we deflate a bloated NGO industry? De-centre our Western wealth and power and re-centre citizens as the main source of support? How would we visualise the resulting, very different, civil society landscape? There will be substantial transformation, disruption, certainly degrowth as a result. We need to be honest about that, too.
