The European Union flag in the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Photo: European Parliament
In our introductory remarks, we revisited the “European Union is in the Arctic” statement from the EU’s 2021 Joint Communication on A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic. If the EU is indeed in the Arctic, how have various Arctic stake- and rights-holders – from Member States to Indigenous communities – perceived the Union’s Arctic engagement over the past 15 years? With our Series on the European Union’s Arctic Policy – From a Stakeholder Perspective, we wanted to contribute to a better understanding of the EU’s Arcticness by exploring the interlinkages between the EU’s Arctic policy and actions, and the views, ideas and approaches of EU Member States and other stake- and rights-holders.
A policy in the constant process of making
As of today, there seems to appear to be an ongoing perception that the EU’s Arctic policy continues to be troubled by fragmentation and a lack of comprehensive knowledge basis for decision-making among European policy-makers. This does not necessarily refer to the policy itself but rather to the broader spectrum of EU legislative and funding initiatives that affect the Arctic regions on a broader level. The EU has certainly made much progress in that respect over the past 15 years, regularly commissioning reports supporting its policymaking, engaging stake- and right-holders and the research community in programming development and territorial cooperation funding and in science prioritization. One proposal in our series aimed at further addressing these policy-making challenges to introduce greater systems thinking and apply related analytical tools towards designing a more coherent EU presence in the Arctic. Some contributors also proposed to engage with Arctic Indigenous Peoples in a long-term process of co-production of knowledge that underlies EU Arctic policy-making.
Engaging Arctic Indigenous Peoples
The interactions with Indigenous Peoples and especially the Sámi have been in fact one of the features of the EU’s Arctic policy for over a decade. The position of the Sámi in the EU’s policy-making both in general and specifically in the context of the Arctic policy is, however, a peculiar one. The EU has developed a comprehensive approach to Indigenous Peoples’ rights and interests in its development cooperation with the Global South. This comprehensive approach, however, is not reflected in the EU’s internal actions and policies.
At present, one of the greatest challenges for the EU-Sami relations is the pursuit of low carbon transition, which requires the expansion of renewable energy production and increased extraction of critical minerals. Within Europe, northern Fennoscandia is likely to be one of the focus areas for these developments. The expansion of these green industries can contribute to regional development but also affects the traditional livelihoods of the Sámi and other forms of land use in the region. The EU is not responsible for permitting processes and local economic planning, but drives developments via its policies and funding. EU institutions could therefore contribute to establishing a framework for green growth that respects the rights of Indigenous Peoples and advances genuine participatory processes, including the possibility to abandon projects that cannot be reconciled with critical values and human rights. Here, authors proposed that the EU’s internal policy on Indigenous Peoples’ rights, including the principle of free, prior and informed consent has to be a part of the solution.
Supporting or competing with Member States?
Ever since the Commission’s first Communication on Arctic matters from 2008, various Member States – both Arctic and non-Arctic – have also presented, articulated and communicated their Arctic ideas. Our series revealed that while there is an interest by some Member States for a stronger role at the EU level in selected areas (research programmes and funding, sustainable regional development, and fisheries), discrepancies nevertheless remain between the Union’s Arctic policy itself and the various regional approaches by regionally-interested Member States.
From a Finnish perspective, the EU should adopt a more elaborate and targeted approach towards Finland and the European Arctic if the Union wants to effectively address the complex challenges posed by the Arctic environment, mitigate potential risks and externalities, and enhance its preparedness for geopolitical developments. This is especially salient due to Finland’s political setting as Russia’s Arctic neighbor, which was affected by the war on Ukraine, the changed geopolitical situation in northern Europe, as well as by the fallout of crumbling Russia-West relations on the Finnish economy and on cross-border interactions. This means, among others, adjusting investment priorities, repurposing funding programmes, and considering the Finnish-Russian frontier from the perspective of the EU and Europe as a whole, including in carrying out strategic foresight efforts.
Science diplomacy and the role of scientific advice in Arctic policymaking was key to our Series’ contribution on Italian Arctic dilemmas. Here, the author suggested that if Italy aims to pursue its goals in the Arctic in unisono with the European Union, the country needs to adjust its environmental goals for the region, or better justify its regional position in terms of the future use of Arctic resources.
The Estonian policy towards the Arctic is in the process of elaboration and the country eyes involvement in the work of the Arctic Council, although the war in Ukraine has removed the opportunities for accepting new observers far into the future. The distinct feature of Estonia’s approach to the EU’s Arctic engagement is the emphasis on the possible EU Arctic policy contributions to enhancing political and environmental security of Europe and Baltic region in relation to the developments taking place in the Arctic.
Dealing with the Russian Federation
The relationship with Russia has always played a central role in the EU’s thinking about the Arctic (albeit not necessarily emphasized prominently in the Union’s Arctic policy statements), even if cooperation venues have been limited when compared to interactions with other Arctic states and stakeholders across the European Arctic. Currently, even these relatively limited cooperation venues have collapsed following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As such, Russian partners have been shut out of the Northern Dimension and the EU’s cross-border projects. However, the Arctic can still be seen as one of those policy areas where Russia and the EU could start to work together again, if and when the war in Ukraine and mutual sanctions arrive at some kind of resolution.
What’s next on the EU’s Arctic agenda?
In the coming years, the EU’s presence and activities in the Arctic, as well as its related engagement with Arctic policy-makers, stake- and rights-holders can be expected to be driven by several factors. First, the ongoing war in Ukraine will affect Arctic cooperation and the economic and political developments in the region. While the Arctic Council work has resumed in a very limited format (with the capability of this format to deliver any concrete outputs being unknown), Russia has just recently left the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Formal scientific cooperation remains all but frozen. The accession of Finland and soon possibly Sweden to NATO and the stronger involvement of the EU in defense policy is bound to create additional challenges for future cooperation. A second factor concerns the question of the progression of European Green Deal policies on the Union’s Arctic engagement. Increased focus on green transition investments can easily fuel tensions linked to renewable energy and mining industries, affecting various Arctic actors’ perceptions of the EU as a regional stakeholder. Third, after the 2024 European Parliament elections, we will see a new political set-up in EUrope, with a new European Commission potentially adopting a different list of priorities. As such, the EU is also bracing for a possible new wave of populist resurgence in several Member States, with hard to forecast implications for the EU’s presence in the Arctic in the long-term. In addition, the 2024 US presidential elections and the federal elections in Canada (taking place the latest in October 2025) may affect the EU’s relations with the two key Arctic partners as well. Fourth, it is difficult to envisage that EU Member States become opposed to the EU’s Arctic engagement or the EU’s investments in Arctic objectives. However, the level of investment will be affected by the more general discussions and Member States governments’ positions on the EU’s budget and programmes. The discussion – which has already started – on the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework after 2027 will show whether a European Union that is facing multiple crises, can retain its current level of interest and involvement in Arctic affairs. Finally, the 2021 Joint Communication highlighted the need for the EU to develop stronger strategic foresight related to Arctic developments, especially in relation to the high pace of climate change in the region. Considering the discussed multiple drivers and the high level of uncertainty, the ability and willingness to engage and take account of such strategic foresight has become more important than ever before.
