The writer is editorial director and a columnist at Le Monde
The mystery remains. None of the five European leaders who have visited Beijing since China ended its zero-Covid policy has managed to lift the cloud of ambiguity on Xi Jinping’s real intentions over Russia and Ukraine. Not even Emmanuel Macron, president of France, who spent six hours with the Chinese leader this week during a three-day state visit and was joined for part of the talks by European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen.
Olaf Scholz, the German chancellor, was the first to rush to Beijing last November. All he got, apart from resuming high-level economic and trade contacts, was a reminder in a vaguely-worded statement that China opposed the use of nuclear weapons. Charles Michel, president of the European Council, followed a few weeks later, as Chinese and Russian air forces were conducting joint exercises. He got words of support for the EU’s “mediation efforts” — which did not exist.
Then, last month, came the Spanish prime minister, Pedro Sanchez. According to the newspaper El Mundo, the Chinese leader went as far as to acknowledge in their conversation that Ukraine was a sovereign state and had a right to exist. But within which borders? And the concept of sovereignty may be subject to interpretation. After all, in a joint statement after the Putin-Xi summit on February 4, 2022, Russia and China claimed to be the true guardians of democracy.
Surely no one expected Macron to get cold feet after those failed attempts? It was he who tried — and failed — to talk Donald Trump in to sticking to the Iran nuclear deal; he also tried, and failed, to deter Vladimir Putin from starting a war. But he has not lost faith in his power of persuasion. He is convinced that China is the only country able to sway Russia over the war in Ukraine, for better or worse. China, a French official said, can be a “game-changer” — it was worth trying again. Bringing von der Leyen along showed it was not only a French effort, but a European one — although the Chinese showed their own sense of political hierarchy, showering the French head of state with pomp and ceremony, while reserving much more modest treatment for the commission president.
Xi may be a game-changer, but he is keeping his cards close to his chest. The French did not expect him to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; the Chinese leader’s visit to Moscow last month proved the enduring strength of their “no-limits friendship” (although it is an asymmetric one). Early hopes of a mediating role for China have also been abandoned.
But Paris still thought that China could play a “major role” in helping to “define conditions” for a way out of the conflict. Giving assurances that it will not provide Russia with lethal weapons would definitely help. Phoning Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelenskyy would also be useful, Macron and von der Leyen suggested.
Ever elusive, Xi did not turn down their requests, nor did he concretely endorse them. Weapons? “This is not our war”. Calling Zelenskyy? He will do it, he said, “when time and conditions are right”. Neither did Xi condemn the future deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus planned by Putin.
In a scathing speech on China’s ambition to become “the world’s most powerful nation” a week ago, von der Leyen noted that how Beijing “continues to interact with Putin’s war will be a determining factor for EU-China relations going forward”.
The issue did indeed dominate her visit and Macron’s talks, but the stakes were even higher. Caught between a rock and a hard place, Europe is trying to gauge China’s intentions at a critical moment in dangerously tense Sino-American relations. The succession of European leaders’ meetings with Xi contrasts strikingly with the absence of American visitors.
The war in Ukraine has simultaneously strengthened the transatlantic alliance and pushed Russia into China’s arms, with the rest of the world feeling left out. European leaders admit that in the EU’s official 2019 tripartite description of China as “partner, competitor and systemic rival”, the rivalry now largely overshadows the partnership. Nevertheless, Berlin, Paris and Brussels want to “de-risk” the relationship with China, not “decouple” from it.
Von der Leyen is right: the world and China have changed dramatically over the past three years. But so has Europe. The pandemic, along with Beijing’s disastrous “mask diplomacy” and “wolf-warrior” lectures from Chinese ambassadors, taught European governments a lesson about dependency. China’s attempt to make inroads into central and eastern Europe, through its Belt and Road Initiative and an aggressive diplomatic approach have backfired.
The EU is now building tools to protect itself from foreign interference. It is also learning to behave like a world power. Von der Leyen and Macron’s tough words in Beijing may have surprised the Chinese leadership.
Yet Macron had more than 50 chief executives travelling with him. And China is the EU’s largest trading partner. A more assertive China and a more assertive Europe are now trying to find common ground in a world where geopolitical realities clash with economic interests.
