This article first appeared in Forum, The Edge Malaysia Weekly on September 25, 2023 – October 1, 2023
The European Union (EU) has always been a member of the G20 — formed to be more representative of the world economy — since its summit in November 2008. Already a member of the increasingly less representative but hitherto full-of-swagger G7 and G8, the EU just walked in as a G20 member, as grandees even of a withering regime do.
Now the African Union (AU), representing a continent often left out of such councils, has become a member of G20. India, as the 2023 chair of G20, is to be applauded for the admission of the AU at the summit in New Delhi two weekends ago.
Whither Asean, the fastest-growing economic region in the world, with all the promise that comes from the globe’s third-largest market, rising middle class, and a young, dynamic and technology-savvy population?
Actually, Asean has been attending as an observer at G20 summits ever since then British chair Gordon Brown invited its involvement in the 2009 London summit, that too because the UK prime minister personally knew Abhisit Vejjajiva, then prime minister of Thailand and chair of Asean.
I remember asking Abhisit in London what were the points Asean might want to raise, bearing in mind the financial and economic crisis that was sweeping major economies as a result of poor risk management and governance in major western banks, compounded by dismal supervision. He said there was none, and that Asean would just observe proceedings.
Since then, Asean has been doing just that — observe. Meanwhile, so many issues of great moment have arisen, that a representation at G20 would have helped. Ranging from the calamities of the Western financial crisis that was discussed in 2009 to the economic consequences of the war in Ukraine, much talked about since the Russian invasion in February last year, these are matters on which Asean should have wanted to mark its position, and to be taken seriously as a region of import.
However, as in many strategic issues of foreign policy, Asean would rather obfuscate with general and inane statements usually of not much consequence. Indeed, Asean has developed a great ability on these matters to reduce any colour to grey.
It would have been momentous had Asean been invited to become a member of G20 last year when Indonesia was the chair. Indonesia, of course, is a member of G20 in its own right, as South Africa is from the African continent, and as so many EU members are in their national capacity.
Singapore, not to be outdone, cleverly formed the Global Governance Group (3G), comprising medium and small countries not represented in G20 and, as Convener, gets invited to its summits. This year, in New Delhi, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was very much in evidence giving his views on a whole range of world issues.
Would it were Asean half as clever. But no, Asean has not pushed to become a member of G20, for itself, and to raise the voice of the Global South in a destabilised and changing world order. This is not surprising because Asean is not organised to make that push as there is not the kind of leadership in the regional grouping to get so organised, and its member states would first think of themselves, resulting in the parts (Singapore, Indonesia) being greater than the whole.
It is time for Asean to get organised for effective representation on strategic foreign policy issues, particularly of the economic kind, if it wants to be felt as the force it says it has become. Malaysia, part of the whole left behind, which does not do too well for itself, might want to take the lead to get Asean into G20.
This, of course, is not a matter of making a speech or two, and then leaving an idea stone cold. It involves intelligent, continuous and vigorous diplomatic effort of the type the EU is adept at. It is an effort worth making.
A strategic foreign policy directorate should be formed in the secretariat to propose an Asean stand on geoeconomic issues, how to make the Asean voice heard and to advance the Asean interest. This directorate should act independently to present its position papers to the Asean Coordinating Council (ACC), which meets twice a year, but their foreign ministers come to their meetings with linear and immediate matters without time for the breadth and depth of geostrategic thinking.
Even with immediate foreign policy issues, like the South China Sea, or intra-regional challenges like the Myanmar situation, Asean cannot be said to have distinguished itself. The habit of taking unified stands on foreign policy issues is important. Divergent, or conflicting, foreign policies can cause fissures, even disrupt Asean unity.
The ACC remains the most important body in Asean to take matters up to the leaders. The input that gets into its deliberation is critical to what it puts up to the leaders. While Asean is in absolute need to improve its institutional mechanism to make decisions, it does not look like this is going to happen any time soon. Even during the depth of the Covid crisis, a proposal made to expedite decision-making by setting up an ad hoc body was quietly ignored, after so many nods of agreement in typical Asean fashion.
So, to be realistic, the objective has to be to make the ACC work better on fundamental global issues, with input from a strategic foreign policy directorate in the secretariat.
On G20 membership, which surely
Asean must want, it might be useful to see how the EU is represented at the summit, as well as how it works its influence in between summits. The president of the European Council and the president of the European Commission attend the summits. Clearly, for Asean, the chair for the year and the Asean Secretary General will be its representatives.
For meetings involving finance, the EU commissioner for the economy and president of the European Central Bank attend. The Asean representatives would have to be the finance minister of the country holding the chair, as well as its central bank governor, as, obviously, Asean has no central bank.
Importantly, there has to be a lot of work of economic diplomacy leading to the summit, so as to secure understanding and support. It would be best for this to be done by permanent members, perhaps newly appointed experts, of the Asean secretariat to avoid the stop-go of the yearly change in the country holding the chair.
The idea of having a “troika” in Asean leadership, comprising the chair for the year plus the outgoing chair and the incoming chair for the next year is good, but it is a half-way house, and it will first have to be seen how it works, if it works at all. In any case, the “troika” is unlikely to have the kind of expertise on the strategic issues and will most probably concentrate on the kind of “linear” and important economic growth issues that take up so much of Asean time.
Bottom line, the most important thing is to get Asean to become a member of G20, to be well prepared, to participate actively, to make its voice heard, and to make its weight count.
Tan Sri Dr Munir Majid is chairman of CARI Asean Research and Advocacy
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