Russia’s war on Ukraine and its consequences for Europe’s security order usher the European integration project into a new chapter: The phase of power, writes Ricardo Borges de Castro.
Ricardo Borges de Castro is Associate Director at European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels.
After the phase of ‘peace and reconciliation’ (1951-1991) and the phase of ‘prosperity and reunification’ (1991-2021), the European Union needs now to adapt to a new context of permacrisis that is more uncertain, volatile, and unpredictable than before. Hard power has become a key currency of international politics and the EU should adjust to this evolving reality.
Although the EU has attempted unsuccessfully in the past to become a more credible geopolitical actor, the events unleashed by Russia on 24 February 2022 are a watershed moment for Europe, and the Union can only thrive if it learns and speaks the language of power in this new environment.
Challenges lie ahead. The EU’s crash course in geopolitics will be shaped by key structural changes to the global order and adverse trends. A clear understanding of these framing factors along with foresight, unity, and political will, can be the difference between EU mastering or not the coming decade.
Structural changes
The nature of power has changed. Traditional elements of power alone – population, territory, GDP, and military might – are no longer sufficient to exert influence in today’s world. Relationships, connectivity, technology, and soft power are as important to navigate the 21st century. Yet, hybrid threats, including the weaponisation of mundane goods and events such as information, energy, food, or movements of people, are on the rise.
The number of global players has increased. Non-state actors (malicious or not), private foundations, civil society, networks, cities and regions, as well as influential individuals have joined nation-states, international organisations, and multinational corporations on the world stage, making it more complex.
Additionally, emerging powers with the ability to re-shape international relations such as China are increasingly more assertive. And Russia’s war on Ukraine is now the most serious test to the order that emerged after World War II.
The pace of change is also accelerating. The speed of the technological and digital revolution is increasing, a trend further bolstered by the COVID-19 pandemic. Governments – especially democracies – lag when it comes to adapting to disruptive technologies and offsetting their potential negative effects. More robust anticipatory democracies are needed to face this growing challenge. If European democracy can’t be faster, it needs to be smarter.
Adverse trends
Digitalisation and the tech revolution were accelerated by the pandemic. Today, digital tech is an integral part of how countries govern or fight, as well as of how people work, learn, consume, socialise, and access services. The tech revolution increasingly shapes geopolitics too. When compared to the ongoing race between the US and China on Artificial Intelligence, robotics, 5G, chips, quantum, and other cutting-edge technologies, the EU is behind and that undermines its global standing.
Following current trends, the global temperature is expected to increase by 1.5°C by 2040, and even earlier, if emissions are not drastically cut in the coming years. This will likely accelerate the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events, droughts, forest fires, and loss of biodiversity, with important implications for everything from food (in)security, global and local governance to displacement of populations and conflict. The EU will be called to step-in and step-up in responding to the effects of climate change.
While demographic patterns are mixed within Europe, the overall trend shows that there will be fewer Europeans, and they’ll be older in general. By 2030, it is projected that 25.5 per cent of Europe’s population will be over 65. There are many implications, but by far the most relevant is the future sustainability of Europe’s welfare state – only a strong and resilient social contract can support a credible EU in global affairs.
Not only will Europeans be fewer and older, but Europe’s economic power is also waning. The economy matters to Europe’s role in the world, and it is expected that by 2030, the EU27 will become the world’s third economic power after China and the US. What is more, the pandemic and Russia’s aggression on Ukraine revealed EU global value-chains’ dependencies and vulnerabilities likely to lead to a transformation of the current model of globalisation and free trade.
Europe’s (and the West’s) governance model is also being challenged worldwide. Until 2005, democracy and freedom were on the rise. But, according to FreedomHouse, for the last 16 consecutive years, the adherence to fundamental rights and freedoms and the rule of law has been steadily declining. COVID-19 made matters worse. In Europe too, democratic backsliding is spreading. That should be an eye opener for policymakers when they consider Europe’s place in the world.
The global decline of democracy may also be a result of the return of great power (strongman) politics, which is testing the international, rules-based multilateral order, resulting in a much more demanding environment for the EU. And the outcome of Russia’s illegal war of aggression on Ukraine will indeed determine the future of Europe’s peace and security order.
‘Learning the language of power’
Supporting Ukraine to win and making sure that Russia does not get away with a brutal war of aggression, as well as all the crimes committed against Ukrainians should be at the top of the agenda of any European leader.
But to eventually master the permacrisis the EU and its member countries need to understand the ongoing profound structural changes and key trends shaping the EU’s global role and adapt to this new ‘phase of power’ in the European integration project.
