Pacific trade deal is more useful to Joe Biden than it is to the UK’s economy | International trade

Tory MPs hailed the UK’s entry last week into the Indo-Pacific trading bloc as a major step on the road to re-establishing Britain as a pioneer of free trade.

It was a coup for Rishi Sunak, said David Jones, the deputy chairman of the European Research Group of Tory Eurosceptics, who was excited to be aligned with “some of the most dynamic economies in the world”.

Trade secretary Kemi Badenoch also used the word “dynamic” to describe the 11 members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). She pushed back against criticism that signing a trade deal with a loose collection of countries on the other side of the world would only add 0.08% to the UK’s gross national product, and then only after 10 years of membership. That figure was an estimate by civil servants 10 years ago, she said in an interview with the Daily Mail. The CPTPP is more important these days.

And it might be, but not for the trade it facilitates. The significance lies in the geopolitical realignment it promotes and how such pacts could harm future Labour governments.

The CPTPP was signed on 8 March 2018. Australia, Brunei, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore were the first to form a bloc before being joined in the five years that followed by Vietnam, Peru, Malaysia and Chile.

Former president Barack Obama hoped the US would also be a founder member before coming up against a Republican Congress that disagreed. Later, Donald Trump abandoned the deal altogether.

Obama wanted to throw a friendly arm around Pacific countries threatened by China’s increasingly aggressive attitude to its neighbours – or, looked at another way, maintain open markets for US goods and services across south-east Asia in opposition to Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road investment initiative. Joe Biden, despite having control of Congress, refused to consider reopening talks about US membership, paving the way for China to apply in 2021.

Thankfully for Biden, Britain’s application preceeded Beijing’s by six months, putting the UK ahead in the queue; quickly it became apparent that Britain’s role could be to help block China’s entry to the CPTPP without the US ever needing to join. For the Americans, the potential loss of trade was a side issue.

Brexit was never considered by Washington to be a positive development, but there was a silver lining once it became clear the UK could be deployed more flexibly in a fight with China – a confrontation that Brussels has so far backed away from.

The Aukus defence pact between Australia, the UK and US is another example of this anti-China coalition – and of Sunak’s efforts to win back Washington’s approval.

The move also plays to a domestic agenda. In the same way that Margaret Thatcher’s sale of state assets – from council housing to essential utilities – denied Labour the means to directly influence the economy without spending hundreds of billions of pounds renationalising those assets, so global trade deals undermine Labour’s promise to use the state to uphold workers’ rights and environmental protections.

Secret courts form the foundation stone of most trade deals and allow big corporations to sue governments when laws and regulations change and deny them profits.

Badenoch’s civil servants say they are comfortable with the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) tribunal system because the UK government has never lost a case.

However, a government that wanted to push ahead at a faster pace with environmental protections, carbon taxes, or enhanced worker’s rights might find themselves on the wrong end of a court judgment.

The TUC’s general secretary, Paul Nowak, was quickly out of the blocks to voice these fears when the deal was announced on Friday. That is why the EU parliament has forced Brussels to ban ISDS clauses from future trade deals.

Sunak, on the other hand, appears comfortable with the prospect of CPTPP countries beginning to dictate how the UK considers basic rights – and how this could become the price of easier trade, and more importantly, foreign policy.