China Woos Europe But EU’s Protectionist Instinct Lingers On

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s six-day visit to Europe in May, when he returned after five years for his first post-pandemic visit, covered France, Serbia, and Hungary, that is, western, central, and eastern Europe. China is commemorating 75 years of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), so this diplomatic outreach by Xi has special significance for the country’s foreign policy. In addition to his wife, Peng Liyuan, Xi was accompanied by Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Cai Qi, Director of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) General Office. The three countries were selected for geopolitical and geo-economic reasons, and the visit was also timed to coincide with other strategic considerations.

First, Xi’s visit to France is emblematic of his outreach to the European Union as a whole. Although France and Germany are two of the most consequential countries in the EU, Germany was not included since the German Chancellor had already visited China in April with a large and diverse business delegation. France and China are celebrating the 60th anniversary of bilateral relations, and Xi had previously visited France in 2014 and 2019, coinciding with his third year in office as General Secretary of the CPC and his second year in office as President, in his first and second terms respectively. The current visit continues the tradition in Xi’s third term.

Unlike China’s ties with other major Western powers, there is a unique history of sustained friendship with France, with certain historical congruencies and linkages. In fact, Xi, during his visit, characterised the two countries as “representatives of Eastern and Western civilisations” with “a long history of mutual appreciation and admiration”. Both were empires that transformed into modern republics after a revolution. Some leading revolutionary leaders of Communist China such as Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping not just studied and worked but also built their ideological foundations in France. When the Cold War was raging, France acted as a bridge between Maoist China and the capitalist West. France, in 1964, was the first major Western power to establish official diplomatic ties with China, 15 years before the US. Currently, the two are permanent members of the UN Security Council, and their bilateral relations carry immense weight in the contemporary world.

Xi’s visit to Hungary was his second as President. The visit was timed to coincide with the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties. Hungary is China’s top investment destination in central and eastern Europe, and one of the first countries to recognise the PRC. By 2017, China and Hungary had established a comprehensive strategic partnership. Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is seen in the EU as a rebellious leader who has charted his country on a path towards an illiberal democracy; he has been at odds with the EU over Brussels’ punitive actions on Russia against which Xi’s China offers Orbán a diversified partnership. There is significant convergence between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Hungary’s Eastern Opening strategy, which Xi highlighted during the visit. Moreover, Hungary took over the rotating EU Council presidency in July.

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This is Xi’s second visit to Serbia as President, the first being in 2016 when China-Serbia ties were transformed into a strategic partnership. Serbia is China’s first comprehensive strategic partner in central and eastern Europe. Xi called Serbia’s ties with China “a model for state-to-state and people-to-people interactions”, quite a unique characterisation of a European country. In fact, China is the largest investor and the second largest trading partner for Serbia. Xi’s visit was timed to coincide with the 25th anniversary of the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. China and Russia had supported Serbia while the West backed Kosovar independence. The bombing soured China’s ties with the US, hence, Serbia’s special significance. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, like Orbán, has been facing criticism from the EU for attempting to undermine the growth of liberal democracy in Serbia and for his friendly relations with the Russia. Moreover, both China and Serbia have ambitions of territorial revanchism, reflected in their push to reunify Taiwan and Kosovo, respectively.

‘Olympic truce’

During Xi’s visit, China and France signed 18 agreements on aviation, agriculture, people-to-people exchange, green development, and SME (small and medium-sized enterprise) cooperation. Also, both countries issued four joint statements on the situation in West Asia, on AI and global governance, on biodiversity and oceans, and on agricultural exchanges and cooperation. Xi also supported Emmanuel Macron’s call for an “Olympic truce”, as France is hosting this year’s summer Olympics. Xi also attended the China-France-EU trilateral meeting where he had talks with Macron and with the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. This format was used in 2023 when Macron visited China. The trilateral was aimed to achieve some headway on Russia and the electric vehicle (EV) issue, although it ended with all sides reiterating their respective positions.

Serbia became the first European country to sign on to China’s new initiative of a “Global community with a shared future in the new era”. A total of 29 agreements were signed with Serbia, including one to join the International Lunar Research Station to be set up by China in the 2030s. It is important to note that Serbia is the only country in Europe outside the post-Soviet states to join the initiative, which is pitted against the US-led Artemis Accords on outer space exploration. As for Hungary, ties were elevated to an “All-Weather Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the New Era”. China and Hungary signed around 18 agreements, including on trade, investment, agriculture, healthcare, science and technology, atomic energy, tourism, and media.

On issues concerning Europe, Xi reiterated at the trilateral that “China did not start the Ukraine crisis, nor is it a party to or a participant in it”. Rather, he reiterated, China is playing a constructive role in the peaceful resolution of it. Nevertheless, Xi clearly underlined that any attempt at resolution needed to consider the “security concerns of all sides”. Xi also called for a conference to end the conflict, with “equal participation of all parties and fair discussions on all peace plans”.

Xi stressed the need to solve the root of the Israel-Palestine issue and its spillover into the Red Sea and West Asia, which is the realisation of the two-state solution with full Palestinian statehood. While Europe put its weight behind Israel in the wake of the Hamas attacks, it has become increasingly wary of Israel’s massive retaliation on Gaza.

Perhaps the most important agenda for Xi was to highlight the need for France in general and Europe in particular to chart an independent course on issues of regional and global significance rather than be led blindly by the US. Xi referred in particular to the importance that both countries give to independent thinking on the world stage. France has many times raised the issue of strategic autonomy for itself and Europe even though it is a NATO member. In fact, Macron has been pushing for a European security architecture and nuclear deterrent distinct from NATO as well as for brokering peace with Russia. In this context, Xi remarked that “the two sides should uphold independence and jointly prevent a new cold war or bloc confrontation… they should… work together for an equal and orderly multipolar world”.

Another major issue covered was that of the overcapacity problem in China’s new energy industry and its impact on industrial competitiveness and market space in Europe. The EU has started a probe into subsidies provided by the Chinese government to its electric vehicle and solar panel sector and is threatening tariffs to offset these. Xi denied the existence of overcapacity and said that China’s high manufacturing capacity could cater to the growing global demand and address inflation. Moreover, Xi noted that China’s advanced capacity can greatly augment the global response to climate change and accelerate the march towards a green future.

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During his visit, Xi spent considerable time conveying the message that China would further open up its market and expand opportunities for Europe’s businesses as it stepped up its pursuit of “high quality development”. Xi’s remarks were clearly meant for Europe as a whole. Xi attempted to offer more market access for French agricultural products in return for France moving away from discriminatory policies on Chinese exports and investments. This offer seems tailor-made for Macron, who has been facing incessant agricultural protests within his country.

Xi’s visit was aimed at embedding China deeper into the European economy and, on a larger level, at shoring up support for China’s vision in an increasingly fractured world. China has come a long way from its period of sustained double-digit growth and is projecting only 5 per cent growth this year. In fact, it is set to decline to 3.5 per cent by 2028, as per the IMF. The stagnation of economic reforms in the past few decades, the return of party-state interventionism in the Xi era, and the rising political risks associated with the Chinese economy, compounded by a decline in demographic dividend, are dragging down China’s economic trajectory. At this time, China requires a big boost to its economy, and it sees Europe as an advanced market for its “new quality productive forces” and as a source of technological collaboration to climb the global value chain.

Efforts to refashion the US-dominated global order

Some analysts have argued that Xi’s visit was aimed at breaking EU unity. However, China’s intent seems much broader: to sow dissension in the Western camp. The EU in total is a market of 450 million people, indispensable for China. Xi’s messaging in France was as much aimed at his host as at the EU, and he discussed regional and global issues with both Macron and von der Leyen. Through France, Xi was reaching out to the rest of the EU to prod it away from a potentially confrontational course with China.

The EU has been reluctant to pursue a path of decoupling ever since the Donald Trump administration started the trade war with China. Rather, it has, over time, chosen a more diluted approach of derisking wherein the overdependence on perilous supply chains passing through China is reduced while still allowing bilateral trade and investment to expand. That way, Europe in general is much less hawkish than the US whose economic engagement with China is extremely securitised, even under the Joe Biden administration.

China’s efforts to refashion the US-dominated global order will not be possible if Europe remains completely in concert with the US, as in the case of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. To effect any transformation, China requires Europe to be on its side in the coming years. With this in mind, Xi throughout the visit called on his host countries to “jointly reject hegemonism and power politics and oppose bloc politics or bloc confrontation”, and to “uphold the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, practice true multilateralism, and promote international fairness and justice”. In short, partner with China to contest the US-led world order.

However, within a month of the visit, Xi’s charm offensive on Europe seems to have hit a wall. Just a few days after Xi’s visit, the US announced the imposition of tariffs on new energy imports from China, including Chinese EVs. Within a month from this, the EU firmed up its mind on Chinese EVs by announcing the conclusion of investigations and the preliminary imposition of tariffs. Xi’s visit clearly did not reap the dividends, at least in the short term, as EU’s protectionist instinct seems to have outweighed the lure of China. Moreover, at a larger level, it also signals that the EU will continue to follow the US lead, especially on strategic matters relating to China.

Anand V. is an Assistant Professor (Senior Scale) and Coordinator of the China Study Centre at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education. The views expressed in the article are personal.