As Poland prepares for parliamentary elections on Oct. 15, the country has all the makings of a new European power. It could emerge as a bulwark of Western defense against a revanchist Russia trying to claw its way back into the heart of Europe. Poland is engaged in a massive buildup of its armed forces and was one of the first countries to come to Ukraine’s aid with major weapons deliveries that helped to fend off the Russian invasion. Warsaw’s warnings about Moscow, long belittled in Paris and Berlin, have proven uncannily prescient. Add a dynamic economy that has become the European Union’s sixth-largest, and Poland is a major European power in the making.
As Poland prepares for parliamentary elections on Oct. 15, the country has all the makings of a new European power. It could emerge as a bulwark of Western defense against a revanchist Russia trying to claw its way back into the heart of Europe. Poland is engaged in a massive buildup of its armed forces and was one of the first countries to come to Ukraine’s aid with major weapons deliveries that helped to fend off the Russian invasion. Warsaw’s warnings about Moscow, long belittled in Paris and Berlin, have proven uncannily prescient. Add a dynamic economy that has become the European Union’s sixth-largest, and Poland is a major European power in the making.
Meanwhile, Germany and France no longer have the monopoly on EU leadership that once made them the United States’ preferred strategic partners. Although Germany is now Ukraine’s second-largest military donor after the United States, it is not at all clear that Chancellor Olaf Scholz sees a German leadership role in militarily deterring Russia. French President Emmanuel Macron favored relations with the Kremlin even as Russia was about to invade Ukraine, which is one reason Central and Eastern Europeans don’t trust Paris today.
Poland, however, is nowhere near fulfilling its potential as a strategic actor. The reasons that Warsaw punches below its weight are familiar by now—and entirely self-imposed. It is in constant conflict with the European Commission in Brussels, which has withheld billions of euros from Warsaw over serious rule-of-law concerns. More recently, Poland lost some of its strategic credibility when it banned grain imports from Ukraine.
This is a problem for Washington, which needs strong partners that can constructively shape the European agenda, especially as it turns its attention and resources to the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, it is in Washington’s vital strategic interest that Warsaw, Berlin, Paris, and Brussels reconcile and work together in shaping Europe’s future security order.
This reconciliation is where the Biden administration should concentrate its diplomatic efforts, rather than focusing only on individual European countries.
It will be an uphill climb. Polish-German relations are at a low point. Next to legitimate criticism over German support of the Nord Stream pipelines and Berlin’s initial squeamishness about delivering weapons to help Ukraine fend off the Russian invasion, the Polish government has also launched a toxic campaign to paint Germany as Poland’s enemy. Largely for domestic consumption, Warsaw has demanded vast World War II reparations from Berlin and characterizes the EU as an instrument of German domination over Poland. Germany is weary of being a bogeyman in Polish domestic politics but has not come up with any solutions. Germany’s new national security strategy is deafeningly silent on Poland and instead doubles down on the sputtering Franco-German motor—a nostalgic view of Europe that has rightly drawn much criticism since the document’s release.
Franco-Polish relations have also been tense. In Washington, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki proposed a “strategic partnership” with the United States while deriding attempts of “building strategic autonomy against the United States”—a clear dig at Macron, who has been promoting a more independent, less aligned Europe. Poland was especially wary of Macron’s failed attempts to rekindle relations with Russia just as Moscow’s forces were about to pounce on Ukraine.
Paris and Berlin have a long history of ignoring Warsaw, but attitudes may be slowly shifting. Scholz has acknowledged that Europe’s center of gravity is shifting east, and Macron recently admitted France’s past mistakes in dealing with Central and Eastern Europe. Poland, too, should work on mending these relationships.
Notwithstanding the signals from France and Germany, Western Europe’s strategy still seems to be one of blind hope that the current Polish government will lose the upcoming election in favor of the more pro-European, less confrontational opposition. That outcome is not a given, and similar European hopes for elections to resolve their problems were dashed by Hungary in 2022 and Turkey in 2023. It looks likely that the ruling Law and Justice party will stay in power. Europeans have no choice but to find a way to work together.
The United States tends to be more pragmatic when it comes to concerns over the state of democracy in an important ally. But no matter the election outcome, Washington should encourage its European partners to focus on finding agreement on the strategic challenges ahead. Polish cooperation or even leadership will be critical in this task.
First, the EU is discussing the internal reforms necessary before it can admit Ukraine. A key challenge is the allocation of the EU budget, especially regional development aid and farming subsidies, as a large agricultural state with vast reconstruction needs such as Ukraine will require large-scale EU funds. Poland’s farmers, heavily subsidized by Brussels, have a lot to lose when the EU pie is redivided. Already, Poland has closed its borders to Ukrainian grain competing with Polish crops. Resolving these issues will take difficult work that should not be overshadowed by even bigger disagreements. Warsaw’s ability and willingness to work with its European partners—which Washington should encourage—is thus a prerequisite for Ukraine’s future in the EU.
Second, as concerns grow around insufficient weapons stocks across the NATO states, Europeans are debating how best to strengthen their defense industries. Poland has launched an unprecedented arms buildup to bolster deterrence against repeated Russian threats that it could be the next target after Ukraine. But it has few plans for how to finance the buildup in the decades to come. As Russia’s war in Ukraine drags on and the Europeans take the lead in supplying Kyiv with arms, Washington should encourage joint European acquisition and production of ammunition, missiles, and other weapons.
Finally, Washington should also push Warsaw to get rid of the deadweight of its partnership with Hungary. Although the relationship has deteriorated somewhat over Hungary’s support for Russia, Poland and Hungary remain joined by their antagonism toward Brussels. As long as this alliance lasts, it will undermine Warsaw’s credibility with its European neighbors.
With a continent reshaped by war, Poland is even more certain to play a central European role. After the elections, France and Germany need to get over their paralysis. After years of focusing only on each other, they can no longer ignore the strategic imperative of bringing Poland into the fold. Meanwhile, Poland has a responsibility to stop acting like a petulant spoiler—and start growing into a new and more responsible role.
